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Competing Views 
“National labs do much more than research. Their 
reach can be seen in all sectors of the economy, and 
they help make America the most economically 
competitive country in the world.” 
 
 
Congressman Randy Hultgren  
(Republican, Illinois’14th District) 
December 7, 2012 
Photo credit: Cindy Arnold 
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Competing Views 
“The federal laboratories have received a mandate to 
transfer technology. This, however, is not the same 
as a mandate to help the private sector in the 
development and commercialization of 
technology for the marketplace … The laboratories 
were created to perform the R&D necessary to meet 
government needs, which typically are not 
consistent with the demands of the marketplace.” 
 
Congressional Research Service 




 The 17 National Labs are overseen by the U.S. Department 
of Energy and have a combined $18 billion budget (FY11) 
(U.S. universities spent $65 billion in R&D in 2011) 
 
 Mission: “execute long-term government scientific and 
technological missions … by develop[-ing] …. scientific 
capabilities beyond the scope of academic and industrial 
institutions to benefit the Nation’s researchers and national 
strategic priorities.”  
 
 The labs provide >40% of total U.S. funding for physics, 







Technology transfer at the National Labs – major policies 
 1980 Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act 
 
 1980 Bayh-Dole Act  
 
 1986 Federal Technology Transfer Act  
 
 1989 National Competitiveness Technology Transfer 
Act  
 
 2000 Technology Transfer Commercialization Act 
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Technology transfer mechanisms 
 Cooperative R&D agreements (CRADAs) 
 Work for others (Lab employees temporarily work for a firm) 
 User facilities (e.g. computing center, cyclotron, bio-refinery) 
 Technical assistance (consulting) 
 Spin-outs 
 Personal exchanges 
 Academic publishing 
 Licensing 
8 
The Story of CCADS 
 1999: two NETL engineers invent a way to analyze electrical 
properties of a flame – using “two wires and a butane lighter” 
 Their prototype used two electrodes on either side of a fuel 
injector nozzle to measure important combustion properties 
(e.g. fuel/air composition variations) that cause inefficiencies, 
higher emissions, or faster equipment degradation 
 The intended application was in natural gas turbines 
Photo Credit: NETL 9 
The Story of CCADS 
 June 2000: six NETL employees filed a patent application, 
“Flashback Detection Sensor for Lean Premix Fuel Nozzles,” 
 September 2001: three of those six (along with a visiting 
professor and one other NETL employee) filed a separate 
“continuation-in-part” patent application “Real-time 
combustion controls and diagnostics sensors (CCADS)”   
 The Federal government retained right to these patents. 
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The Story of CCADS 
 On Dec. 28, 2001, NETL announced that it intended to grant 
an exclusive license on both of these patent-pending 
inventions to Woodward Industrial Controls of Fort Collins,  CO 
 Soon thereafter, Woodward entered into a cooperative R&D 
agreement (CRADA) with NETL and continued to jointly 
innovate on this technology. 
• NETL conducted “in-house … fundamental laboratory experiments 
and computational fluid dynamics models” 
• Woodward demonstrated the technology at commercial scale 
Woodward 2012 
Annual Report 11 
The Story of CCADS 
 2005: 2nd Woodward-NETL CRADA initiated  
 NETL continues to conduct R&D on CCADS ($200,000/yr) 
 Woodward is marketing CCADS for commercial application 
 Follow-on innovation led to lower cost and broader 
applicability of CCADS (notably for syngas turbines)  
 NETL estimated full deployment would save $1 billion/year 
 The Two NETL patents have been cited by 4 subsequent 
Woodward patents, 2 subsequent NETL patents, but also by 
companies like Boeing, ALSTOM, and Siemens 
CCADS was installed in a NETL test rig. 
Photo credit: NETL 
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The Story of CCADS: Key Takeaways  
 The initial spark and the funding to develop a prototype 
originated internally at the Lab 
 
 The Lab filed a patent application before licensing and before 
entering into a CRADA 
 
 After licensing IP, the Lab stayed intimately involved (human 
and physical capital) with the technology 
 
 NETL and Woodward cooperatively improved the technology 
for nearly a decade 
 
 Knowledge developed by NETL and Woodward was utilized 
in subsequent internal and external inventions 
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The Story of CCADS: Key Takeaways  
 Exclusive licensing means that other private actors continue 
to be denied access to CCADS, despite its origin in a public 
institution and formal IP held by the government. (The first 5 
of 11 citations to the patents were by Woodward/NETL) 
• Therefore, we might think knowledge diffusion after 
licensing is delayed 
 
 Without exclusive licensing, would any company have been 
willing to invest the necessary resources to develop CCADS? 
Further, commercialized products enable additional channels 
of diffusion and innovation (e.g. learning by using) 
• Therefore, we might think that knowledge diffusion after 
licensing is accelerated 
 
 My project will attempt to estimate the effect of licensing a 
government patent on knowledge diffusion 
14 
Motivation 
Key empirical question: 
 How does the licensing of federally funded inventions affect 
the rate and direction of public knowledge diffusion (as 
measured by new forward citations to patents)? 
 
Motivation: 
 Multiple policy reforms in the past 30 years have made 
licensing publically-funded inventions easier, but have these 
policy shifts helped or hindered the ability of federal labs to 
meet their technology transfer goals? 
 Reviews consistently call for more data and metrics on the 
downstream impacts of Federal technology transfer efforts 
(ITIF/CAP/Heritage, 2013; NIST, 2012; DOE 2012; White House 2011, PCAST 2003) 
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Why do the Labs patent and license patents? 
 The Labs are legislatively-required and are appropriated funds to 
work towards transferring technology 
 By making knowledge appropriable, patenting is a tool to facilitate 
technology transfer 
• In 2008 the Labs disclosed 1,460 new inventions, filed 904 
patent applications, were granted 370 new patents, and 
executed 177 new patent licensing agreements (1,448 
agreements were active) 
• Royalty payments are an individual and institutional incentive to 
license patents. The Labs generated $43.1 mil through their 
active royalty-bearing patent licenses, equivalent to 0.5% of 
their budget. $8.4 mil was distributed in royalties back to 
inventors 
 Technology transfer is part of the organizational mission of DOE to 




 Observations: 1,382 utility patents developed at 3 of the 
National Labs (PNNL, BNL, LBL) since 1990, housed in the 
U.S. Energy Innovation Portal (http://techportal.eere.energy.gov) 
• covariates: the Lab involved, assignee, application date, grant date, 
title, US and international classification, abstract, full text 
 
 License agreements: 420 licensing agreements between one 
of the three Labs and a private sector partner 
• covariates from the Labs: effective dates of the license, basic 
agreement terms (exclusive vs. non-exclusive) 
19 
Method Sketch 
1. Using the sample of 1,382 patents granted to the three Labs, 
construct a panel of patents by age  
 
2. Estimate the causal effect of licensing on the rate of new citations: 
• Run a negative binomial difference-in-difference regression of 
annual forward citations on age dummies and their interaction 
with licensed dummies, lab fixed effects, and total past citations 
 
3. Robustness checks: 
• Use citations only from patents assigned to unique assignees as 
the dependent variable 
• Use a matching approach to compare licensed patents only to 
patents with similar abstracts. Similarity metric calculated with a 
machine learning algorithm, matching based on time-dependent 
propensity score (this is a topic of another paper) 
• Restriction to only exclusively licensed patents 
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Results 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable
Cumulative Citations -0.001 -0.004 -0.087 *** -0.071 ***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.012) (0.011)
Licensed -2 yrs 0.245 0.113 0.911 1.972
(0.271) (0.362) (0.730) (1.150)
Licensed 0 yrs 0.168 0.079 0.592 1.724
(0.242) (0.332) (0.722) (1.162)
Licensed 2 yrs 0.539 * 0.552 1.269 2.536 *
(0.220) (0.315) (0.720) (1.139)
Licensed 4 yrs 0.686 ** 0.812 * 1.473 * 2.851 *
(0.223) (0.319) (0.725) (1.133)
Licensed 6 yrs 0.926 *** 1.162 *** 1.668 * 3.121 **
(0.222) (0.324) (0.727) (1.137)
Licensed 8 yrs 1.004 *** 1.321 *** 1.808 * 3.373 **
(0.236) (0.347) (0.748) (1.155)
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Patent FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Matched Sample? No Yes No Yes
N 478 257 443 244
N * t 3,889 2,151 3,674 2,074
Model: negative binomial; standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Citations from All Assignees Citations from New Assignees





































Years Relative to Time of Licensing
Interpretation of Results 
 Licensing increases the citations that a National Lab patent 
receives.  
 Being licensed induces an increase in the forward citation 
rate to the patent of 1 – 1.5 citations per year beginning 2 
years after the licensing agreement. 
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Robustness Checks: Matching, New Assignees 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable
Cumulative Citations -0.001 -0.004 -0.087 *** -0.071 ***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.012) (0.011)
Licensed -2 yrs 0.245 0.113 0.911 1.972
(0.271) (0.362) (0.730) (1.150)
Licensed 0 yrs 0.168 0.079 0.592 1.724
(0.242) (0.332) (0.722) (1.162)
Licensed 2 yrs 0.539 * 0.552 1.269 2.536 *
(0.220) (0.315) (0.720) (1.139)
Licensed 4 yrs 0.686 ** 0.812 * 1.473 * 2.851 *
(0.223) (0.319) (0.725) (1.133)
Licensed 6 yrs 0.926 *** 1.162 *** 1.668 * 3.121 **
(0.222) (0.324) (0.727) (1.137)
Licensed 8 yrs 1.004 *** 1.321 *** 1.808 * 3.373 **
(0.236) (0.347) (0.748) (1.155)
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Patent FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Matched Sample? No Yes No Yes
N 478 257 443 244
N * t 3,889 2,151 3,674 2,074
Model: negative binomial; standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Citations from All Assignees Citations from New Assignees
Exclusive and Non-Exclusive Licenses
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Robustness Checks: Results for Exclusive Licenses 
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent Variable
Cumulative Citations 0.002 0.001 -0.085 *** -0.070 ***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.013) (0.014)
Licensed -2 yrs -0.025 -0.261 1.130 0.972
(0.403) (0.465) (0.871) (1.287)
Licensed 0 yrs 0.135 -0.027 0.471 0.439
(0.283) (0.360) (0.833) (1.262)
Licensed 2 yrs 0.717 ** 0.665 * 1.620 * 1.680
(0.233) (0.319) (0.820) (1.253)
Licensed 4 yrs 0.802 ** 0.880 ** 1.795 * 1.935
(0.239) (0.327) (0.833) (1.265)
Licensed 6 yrs 0.763 ** 0.965 ** 1.793 * 2.011
(0.243) (0.342) (0.842) (1.277)
Licensed 8 yrs 1.053 *** 1.356 *** 1.952 * 2.293
(0.252) (0.364) (0.879) (1.311)
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Patent FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Matched Sample? No Yes No Yes
N 392 171 362 163
N * t 3,168 1,430 2,985 1,385
Model: negative binomial; standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Exclusive Licenses Only
Citations from All Assignees Citations from New Assignees
25 
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1. Licensing is consistent with the DOE’s goals of fostering 
“scientific capabilities beyond the scope of academic and 
industrial institutions to benefit the Nation’s researchers” 
 
2. Policy reform in the past decades to lower the cost of 
licensing from the National Labs would seem to be well-
justified 
 
3. Anecdotally, several Lab technology transfer offices cite low 
funding as an impediment to broader technology transfer 
efforts. At the margin, my research argues that increasing 
technology transfer effort would accelerate the diffusion of 
the innovations developed at the Labs. 
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Limitations and Next Steps 
 Only examining patented inventions and a subset of 
technology transfer activities 
 
 Relying on a subset of outcome metrics that capture only a 
narrow view of technology transfer success – data on 
royalties and products are confidential 
 
 I hope to add explanatory power with data from more of the 
National Labs 
 
 Comparative work with University technology transfer could 











Stylized facts on patents for public R&D 
 The rationale for the public provision of R&D is rooted in the 
public goods nature of knowledge 
 
 For private R&D, the monopoly a patent confers slows 
diffusion, all else equal. This is seen as a “necessary evil” to 
incentivize R&D investment. 
 
 Public labs don’t respond to economic incentives; innovation 
effort isn’t affected by the lure of surplus profits, so patents 
for publicly funded inventions seem unfair and inefficient. 
 
 However, the public R&D system relies on patents as a 
mechanism to facilitate the transfer of knowledge from 
innovators to commercializers. 
 
 For many public inventions, the (public) returns to the public 





1. For patents of similar substantive content, the effect of 
licensing on diffusion is even greater than when technology 
areas are not controlled for. This could indicate crowding out 
or cumulativeness in the Lab patent portfolio. 
 
2. Exclusive licenses have approximately the same (positive) 
effect on technology diffusion as non-exclusive licenses. 
 
3. Counterintuitively, licensing increases the rate of forward 
citations from new licensees faster than citations from 
incumbents. This could indicate greater concentration in the 
citations to unlicensed patents rather than greater diversity 
in licensed patents. 
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Results for Exclusive Licenses Only 
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent Variable
Cumulative Citations 0.002 0.001 -0.085 *** -0.070 ***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.013) (0.014)
Licensed -2 yrs -0.025 -0.261 1.130 0.972
(0.403) (0.465) (0.871) (1.287)
Licensed 0 yrs 0.135 -0.027 0.471 0.439
(0.283) (0.360) (0.833) (1.262)
Licensed 2 yrs 0.717 ** 0.665 * 1.620 * 1.680
(0.233) (0.319) (0.820) (1.253)
Licensed 4 yrs 0.802 ** 0.880 ** 1.795 * 1.935
(0.239) (0.327) (0.833) (1.265)
Licensed 6 yrs 0.763 ** 0.965 ** 1.793 * 2.011
(0.243) (0.342) (0.842) (1.277)
Licensed 8 yrs 1.053 *** 1.356 *** 1.952 * 2.293
(0.252) (0.364) (0.879) (1.311)
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Patent FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Matched Sample? No Yes No Yes
N 392 171 362 163
N * t 3,168 1,430 2,985 1,385
Model: negative binomial; standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Exclusive Licenses Only
Citations from All Assignees Citations from New Assignees
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Method Sketch 
1. On the sample of 1,382 patents granted to the three Labs, 
classify each based on its patent abstract using a Bayesian 
model of document-level latent topic structure. (Blei, 2010) 
 
2. Use the estimated document classification as patent-level 
covariates in a hazard regression using the lag between 
when a patent was filed and when a licensing agreement 
was announced as the outcome variable. (Cox, 1972) 
 
3. Use the predicted hazard to calculate a time-dependent 
propensity score for a patent being licensed. Match licensed 
patents using a nearest neighbor algorithm. (Lu, 2005)   
 
4. Construct a panel of patents by age and run a negative 
binomial difference in difference regression of annual 
forward citations on a limited set of covariates. 
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Topic Modeling 
 Patent classification is based on the physical phenomenon a 
technology harnesses, not necessarily informative for what 
“useful” application a technology has. 
 
 Automated classification can capture all aspects of a 
technology, as an inventor describes it.  
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Topic modeling approach (inspired by Blei, 2010) 
1. Preprocess the text (remove punctuation, remove stop 
words, stem) 
 
2. Construct a document-term matrix 
 
3. Specify weakly informative priors and a Bayesian model 
structure 
 
4. Fit the model with Monte Carlo methods 
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Topic modeling: The LDA model (Blei, 2010) 
39 
Topic modeling example 
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What is patent 6,887,069 “about”?  
 LDA coding based on 25 topics and 283 NETL patents 
• 16%: fuel, chamber, cell, generat, engin,… 
• 15%: combust, air, zone, heat, system,… 
• 9%: electrod, measur, sensor, segment, particl,… 
• 6%: apparatus, determin, surfac, method, dust,… 
 
 We learn a little bit about a lot of patents. 
 
 But the PTO classification seems to do pretty well: 
• Class 431: … processes of combustion or combustion starting, and for 
apparatus peculiarly adapted to burn or ignite materials.  
• Subclass 12: Processes controlling the supply of fuel or air discharged 
into the combustion zone. 
41 
Another topic modeling example 
42 
What is patent 6,429,020 “about”?  
 LDA coding based on 25 topics and 283 NETL patents 
• 16%: fuel, chamber, cell, generat, engin,… 
• 14%: electrod, measur, sensor, segment, particl,… 
• 10%: combust, air, zone, heat, system,… 
• 6%: surfac, electr, element, compris, conduct,… 
 
 This time the PTO classification doesn’t tell us much about what 
this invention could be used for – no mention of combustion at all: 
• Class 431: the generic class for … process which involve a chemical 
reaction for determining qualitatively or quantitatively the presence of a 
chemical element, compound or complex … [including] tests or 
measurements with methods of regulating a chemical reaction … 
• Subclass 153: Measurement of electrical or magnetic property or thermal 
conductivity … Subject matter wherein an electric or magnetic property of 
an ionized gas is measured as a step in analysis.(1) Note. The gas may 
be the result of heating a liquid sample.(2) Note. Wave or particle 
radiation as well as use of electric discharge to ionize the gas is included 
herein. 
43 
Cox proportional hazard model 
 Using the logit-transformed document-level topic proportions 
as covariates, I estimate a Cox proportional hazard model 
 
 Years since a patent was filed is the “age” of the observations  
 
 Whether or not a patent was licensed as of March 2013 is the 
indicator for censoring (i.e. “failure”). 
 
 With 1,382 observations and 420 licenses, a topic model with 
50 topics performs reasonably well at identifying technology 
areas that lead to more frequently licensed patents 
44 
The topics of patents more likely to be licensed 
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
layer catalyst field dna invent support protein surfac
substrat reaction magnet singl relat tube acid bond
film acid detect crystallin increas includ method molecul
deposit hydrogen frequenc produc use instrument specif wherein
form contain nmr heterostructur low assembl peptid assembl
surfac compound signal segment reduc portion amino silicon
thin process reson nanostructur addit core bind function
materi product object nanowir particular extend provid plural
onto mixtur puls strand effici posit pair monolay
vacuum carbon imag clone accord head orthogon improv
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
reactor imag ion semiconductor structur inner metal form particl
contain system plasma capabl devic thin temperatur solut method
vessel plane generat nanocryst provid unit coat phase densiti
pressur object sourc radiat form outer combin method size
water refer target energi porous sheet heat precursor describ
cool diffract chamber link techniqu defin alloy polar aerosol
dispos optic extract portion electrochem lamin resist solvent distribut
steam pattern produc describ electron medium thereof fluid vapor
tank posit antenna compound fire plural prefer molecul mean
pipe test neutron electromagnet low perform transit dispers reduc
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The topics of patents more likely to be licensed 
 What is Topic 3? 
• Most frequently occurring words: “ion”, “plasma”, “generat”, 
“sourc”, “target”, “chamber”, “extract”, “produc”, “antenna”, 
“neutron” 























6,907,097 54% Cylindrical Neutron Generator Mar 2002 June 2005 
7,176,469 43% 
Negative ion source with 
external RF antenna 
Sept 2003 June 2005 
7,342,988 39% Neutron tubes Feb 2003 June 2005 
6,094,012 39% 
Low energy spread ion source 
with a coaxial magnetic filter 
Nov 1998 Mar 2000 
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Matching on a time-dependent propensity score (Lu, 2005) 
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Formal IP 
1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013
Timing of Patent Filings, Licences, and Grants for the 






 Innovation is stimulated by both supply-push and demand-
pull, and there are public policies that affect one or both 
“forces” 
 Relatively little research has been done to explicitly evaluate 
the effectiveness of public policy to directly stimulate supply-
push drivers of innovation (with the exception of universities). 
 In particular, there is a gap in the literature of studies of 
commercialization of technologies developed by the 
government, which I characterize as public institutions that 
specialize in supply-push operations, engaging with demand-
pull forces 
 I hope to fill this gap by quantitatively studying the 
commercialization of U.S. National Laboratory inventions 
49 
